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Abstract
Background: Foraging in groups offers animals a number of advantages, such as increasing their
likelihood of finding food or detecting and avoiding predators. In order for a group to remain
together, there has to be some degree of coordination of behaviour and movement between its
members (which may in some cases be initiated by a decision-making leader, and in other cases may
emerge as an underlying property of the group). For example, behavioural synchronisation is a
phenomenon where animals within a group initiate and then continue to conduct identical
behaviours, and has been characterised for a wide range of species. We examine how a pair of
animals should behave using a state-dependent approach, and ask what conditions are likely to lead
to behavioural synchronisation occurring, and whether one of the individuals is more likely to act
as a leader.
Results: The model we describe considers how the energetic gain, metabolic requirements and
predation risks faced by the individuals affect measures of their energetic state and behaviour (such
as the degree of behavioural synchronisation seen within the pair, and the value to an individual of
knowing the energetic state of its colleague). We explore how predictable changes in these
measures are in response to changes in physiological requirements and predation risk. We also
consider how these measures should change when the members of the pair are not identical in
their metabolic requirements or their susceptibility to predation. We find that many of the changes
seen in these measures are complex, especially when asymmetries exist between the members of
the pair.
Conclusion: Analyses are presented that demonstrate that, although these general patterns are
robust, care needs to be taken when considering the effects of individual differences, as the
relationship between individual differences and the resulting qualitative changes in behaviour may
be complex. We discuss how these results are related to experimental observations, and how the
model and its predictions could be extended.
Published: 18 February 2008
BMC Evolutionary Biology 2008, 8:51 doi:10.1186/1471-2148-8-51
Received: 12 August 2007
Accepted: 18 February 2008
This article is available from: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/8/51
© 2008 Rands et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
BMC Evolutionary Biology 2008, 8:51 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/8/51
Page 2 of 17
(page number not for citation purposes)
Background
Animals have to make a number of choices when they for-
age – they need to obtain enough food to ensure that they
can survive and reproduce, and do so in a way that ensures
they are as safe as possible. A vast body of theoretical and
empirical work has been published examining these for-
aging decisions [1,2], considering both static cases where
the animal always makes the same decision about what
behaviour it should conduct, and dynamic cases where
the behaviour of the animal may change in response to
time, environmental cues, and its own energetic reserves
[3]. When the animal is foraging, its behavioural decisions
will be affected by the amount of food it gains, but other
factors may also be important, such as the danger of pre-
dation [4-10].
For animals living in social groups, the decisions made by
an individual about foraging are further complicated by
the actions of the other individuals within the group
[11,12]. It may be safer to forage when other members of
the group are foraging, since both increased predator
detection and dilution of risk [13] mean that individuals
may then be able to spend a larger amount of time forag-
ing rather than conducting anti-predator behaviours [14].
However, foraging in groups also brings disadvantages,
such as competition for food [15-18] or an increase in
predator attacks [19]. The study of social foraging [12,20]
asks why animals should forage together, and how this
affects group size [21-24] and the rôles played by individ-
uals within these groups [25].
Despite this interest in social foraging, little attention has
been given to how foragers decide on their own behav-
iours within a foraging group, and how these behaviours
relate to those of fellow group-members. It is known that
many wild and domesticated species of mammals and
birds synchronise their activities within foraging groups,
such that a majority of the group initiate and conduct the
same activity (such as grazing) at the same time. This has
been demonstrated for the start and continuance of forag-
ing behaviour in primates [26-29], ungulates [30-45],
rodents [46,47] and birds [48-54], and in the foraging-
dive behaviour in birds [55-63]. Foraging synchronisation
has been suggested to occur in order to increase group
cohesion, or to reduce risk of predation [reviewed in
[42,43]], but little theoretical work has been done to con-
sider how and when it should occur [but see [64] for a
model that considers how synchronisation in leaving time
is linked to the level of communication shown between
individuals].
Furthermore, if groups are synchronised we are interested
in whether all the individuals within the group are behav-
ing identically, or whether individuals are behaving differ-
ently to each other, but still producing an overall
synchronisation of activities or decisions within the
group. We must ask whether group decisions are initiated
by certain individuals, and what are the special properties
of these individuals that make them more likely to make
decisions that are important to the group. At one extreme,
a single individual may possess unique qualities that are
specific to the decision-making rôle (such as in baboons,
where a single dominant male tends to lead the group
between sites [65,66]), whilst at the other, essentially
identical individuals may consistently make the group's
decisions over a period of time (such as in plains zebra,
where decision-making females within groups were found
to have no specific qualities other than temporarily high
energetic requirements due to lactation [67]). A dynamic
game by Rands et al. [68] exploring activity synchronisa-
tion within foraging groups noted that when the actions
of a pair of animals that are identical in their energetic
requirements and response to environmental parameters
are considered, stable differences can emerge between the
individuals in their energetic reserves and the rôles they
perform within the pair: one individual may consistently
make the decisions about how the pair should forage.
From this result, Rands et al. argued that one individual
can consistently act as a leader without possessing any
special qualities predetermining its role.
To date, whilst the theory of social foraging has been
developed using a variety of analytical and game theoret-
ical techniques, most of the models produced have been
static. In this paper, we develop a dynamic game for a pair
of individuals, foraging together, each facing a trade-off
between starvation and predation risk. State-dependent
models of foraging in groups have been developed previ-
ously [12,69-74], and dynamic games have shown that
diurnal social foraging behaviour [75], social structure
[76], and information centre use [77] can be modelled
using a producer-scrounger dynamic game framework.
However, in the model described by Rands et al. [68], each
of a pair of individuals was able to base its actions upon
its own energetic reserves as well as the actions of its co-
player. The model presented by Rands et al. [68] was a
simple dynamic game which did not consider differences
in foraging ability or energetic requirements between pair
members, which could potentially affect the ability of the
players to synchronise, and the ability of a weaker individ-
ual with low energy reserves to make foraging decisions.
In the current paper, we expand on these results to con-
sider a more general case. We explore how changing the
qualities of identical players (such as differences in forag-
ing ability or susceptibility to predation) can lead to
changes in behavioural properties of the players such as
their likelihood of foraging, as well as measures of their
likelihood of relying upon the other player to make deci-
sions. We then expand on these models to consider play-
ers that can differ in these qualities, to consider whether
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any quality might predispose an individual to the leader-
ship rôle. Using the model, we examine the effects that the
environment and predation risk consequently have upon
the synchronisation of activity.
Results
In describing our results, we begin by considering the
effects of the various parameters on a pair of players that
are identical in their risk of predation, energy reserves,
metabolic costs and likelihood of finding food in the
environment. We then go on to consider cases where the
pair of animals are not identical, and can differ in one or
more of these factors.
General results
The general results follow the rules described by Rands et
al. [68], which we redescribe in more detail here as they
are crucial to later understanding (and we give much
greater consideration to the case where there is a distinct
disadvantage to foraging together). Examples of the forms
of patterns seen are given in Figure 1. If players are identi-
cal and there is no advantage to an individual in foraging
at the same time as its co-player, then the decision the
individual makes is not affected by the energy reserves of
the co-player (giving a synchrony coefficient of D' = 0).
This is seen in the optimal policy of an individual (Figure
1ai), where behaviour is not related to co-player state: if
the individual's energy reserves are below a threshold
value, it forages in order to avoid starvation; if they are
above this threshold, it rests, to avoid exposing itself to a
Examples of policies and population state distributions for identical playersFigure 1
Examples of policies and population state distributions for identical players. a) Typical policy (i) and stable popula-
tion distribution (ii) for an individual where there is no advantage to foraging with a co-player. The policy shows the optimal 
behaviour for an individual when its own energetic reserve values and those of its coplayer are known, where a black square 
means the focal individual should 'forage' during the period, and a white square means that it should 'rest'. (predation risk when 
foraging alone, mA, is equal to the predation risk when foraging with a co-player, mT: mA = mT = 0.0005; all other parameters set 
with defaults values as detailed in table 3). b) Typical policy (i) and stable population (ii) where there is an advantage to foraging 
together: parameters as in table 3; c) another form of policy (i) and its associated stable population (ii) where there is an advan-
tage to foraging together, where symmetry of policy in the central area round the main diagonal ensures that players are syn-
chronised: parameters as in table 3, except cmax = 3 state units, mA = 0.0004, mR = 0.00002, mT = 0.00012.
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higher predation risk. Therefore, energy reserves should
stay near this threshold, as can be seen in the distribution
of energy reserves in a stable population of individuals
following this policy (Figure 1aii).
If foraging alone is more dangerous to the individual than
foraging with a co-player, the optimal behaviour of an
individual is dependent upon the reserves of itself and its
co-player (examples of policies are shown in Figs. 1bi and
1ci). Figure 1bi shows the simplest (and, from simula-
tions, most likely) policy possible. For the policy shown,
behaviour is highly synchronised, giving D' = 0.9985.
Other policies are more complex, and may specify that the
focal individual should forage if its state and that of its co-
player fall at certain values within the central region of the
policy diagram (such as Fig. 1ci, where D' = 1).
The distribution of population energy reserve pairs for
policies where there is an advantage to foraging together
(Figs. 1bii and 1cii) follows the thresholds at which the
players switch behaviours (which can be seen as the edges
of the central region of the policy). In the simplest case
where players always rest when reserves fall in this central
region (Fig. 1bii), the state distribution follows an 'L'-
shape. Looking at the likelihood of paired reserve levels in
a stable population, the correlation between the reserve
pairs is negative (correlation coefficient = -0.589). This
means that when one player has low reserves, its co-player
should have high reserves. As described by Rands et al.
[68], the behaviour of the player with low reserves should
be dictated solely by its own energy reserve, regardless of
the state of its co-player. Because D' ≈ 1, the individual
with high reserves will therefore copy the behaviour of its
co-player. In this situation we therefore expect to see the
states of the players distributed so that one player has low
reserves, and one with high reserves, and behaviour
(determined by the individual with low reserves) should
be synchronised.
Where the central region of the policy is more complex,
the stable population distribution also becomes more
complex (Fig. 1cii), but the energy reserves of the players
still follow the edge of the central policy set. In the case
shown here, pairs of players are locked into two possible
sets of behaviour within the population. A pair could fluc-
tuate around the lower switching thresholds, where one
individual is on the lower threshold and its co-player has
higher reserves, with swapping of rôles only possible
when both individuals reach their lower critical thresh-
olds simultaneously. Similarly, fluctuation could occur
around the upper threshold, with rôle-swapping occur-
ring when both players reach their upper threshold simul-
taneously.
It is assumed throughout this paper that foraging together
confers an advantage when compared to foraging alone,
but we should also consider the case where there are dis-
advantages to foraging with a co-player, such as through
an increased likelihood of detection by predators, or a
reduction in mean energetic gain when foraging together
[16]. We have investigated these situations, and find that
if there is a disadvantage to foraging together, the optimal
policy typically resembles Fig. 2a. Calculations show that
the behaviours of the pair are highly asynchronous, with
a synchrony coefficient value approaching -1 (for the
parameter set used in Fig. 2, D' = -0.999). The population
state-pair distribution is more complex than if foraging
together is advantageous: Fig. 2b shows that the distribu-
tion of state-pairs tends to follow the behavioural thresh-
olds mentioned above, lending a rectangular shape to the
distribution. The paired reserves of the players tend to be
randomly distributed (correlation coefficient = -0.05 for
the population given in Fig. 2b).
It is possible to synthesise the more general results of the
model presented here into a simple behavioural rule of
thumb, as described by Rands et al. [68]: 'if my reserves are
below a set threshold, I should forage; if my reserves are
above the threshold, I should rest unless my partner is for-
aging, when I should also forage' – this describes the 'L'-
shaped region that appears in all the policies generated
where there is some advantage to foraging together (as is
seen in Fig. 1bi). (This is for the case where there is an
advantage to foraging together. If it is disadvantageous to
forage together, as discussed for Fig. 2, then the rule is
more complex and may rely heavily on the calculated pol-
icy to determine an individual's optimal behaviour.) It is
useful to be able to approximate an individual's behav-
iour to a simple rule of thumb such as this, rather than a
complex policy dependent upon an individual under-
standing the reserves and various risk and energetic
parameters of both itself and a partner: as well as making
the optimal behaviour easier to describe, it is easier to
understand how a simple rule could be selected for over
evolutionary time.
However, as noted above, policies that don't display just
an 'L'-shaped region (such as the one shown in Fig. 1ci)
can also occur. The rule-of-thumb is followed in the 'L'-
shaped region, but there is also a region where the actions
of an individual rely upon knowledge of the reserve levels
of both players. Arguably, following a policy that includes
the ability to judge a co-player's energetic reserves requires
more cognitive processing than following the simple rule-
of-thumb suggested above. In cases where these extra pol-
icy regions should be part of in the optimal strategy, we
may still see individuals following a sub-optimal rule-of-
thumb that does not include this extra region. A sub-opti-
mal rule-of-thumb nonetheless approximates to the opti-
BMC Evolutionary Biology 2008, 8:51 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/8/51
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mal strategy, as pairs of animals following this should
never be able to reach a region of state-space where they
can behave sub-optimally. Figure 1cii demonstrates this,
where a stable population is separated into two groups –
those following the 'L'-shaped region of the policy, and
those stuck on the edge of the central region. None of the
Policy and population distributions for identical players when there is a disadvantage to foraging togetherFigure 2
Policy and population distributions for identical players when there is a disadvantage to foraging together. This 
figure shows a case where the risk of being predated when foraging alone is lower than that when foraging together – the opti-
mal policy reflects this by ensuring that players are always engaged in alternative behaviours: a) optimal policy, where darkest 
squares represent 'forage 100% of the time, lightest squares represent 'rest 100% of the time', and intermediate levels of shad-
ing represent a continuum between these two. Parameters are as given in table 3, except that cmax = 3, mA = 0.00002, mR = 
0.00001, mT = 0.00003; b) stable population distribution resulting from policy.
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Table 1: Changes in behaviours, reserves, and other individual properties when parameters are increased in symmetric models. 
Trends in properties described come from visual inspection of result sets: '↑↑' denotes a strong tendency for the property to increase 
in response to a corresponding increase in the parameter investigated; '↑' denotes a noisier but visible increase; '↓↓' denotes a strong 
tendency for the property to decrease; '↓' denotes a noisier but visible decrease; '-' denotes that the value of the property investigated 
did not change in response to changes in the value of the parameter; and '×' denotes that changes in the value of the parameter led to 
unpredictable changes in the property measured.
Property Changes in property in response to
Increase in Increase in Increase in predation risk when
Energetic gain Foraging cost Resting cost Foraging alone Foraging together Resting
Likelihood player forages ↓↓ ↑ ↑↑ ↓↓ ↓ ↑↑
Likelihood both players forage ↓↓ ↑ ↑↑ ↓↓ ↓ ↑↑
Likelihood one player forages, the other 
rests
↓ × - - - -
Likelihood both players rest ↑↑ × ↓↓ ↑↑ - ↓↓
Synchrony coefficient, D' - - ↑ ↑ - -
Mean energy reserves ↑↑ × ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓ ↑↑
Length of time player repeats behaviour ↑↑ × ↓↓ × × ↓
Immediate energy reserves difference 
within pair
↓↓ × ↑ × × ↑
C ↓↓ - ↑↑ ↑↑ ↓ ↓
S ↓↓ - ↑↑ ↑↑ - ↓
BMC Evolutionary Biology 2008, 8:51 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/8/51
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population occur in the intermediate regions of state-
space.
Policy effects of symmetric model
Changes in foraging behaviour in response to changes in
parameters follow predictable patterns (Table 1 details all
the changes seen in response to systematically altering the
parameters: we describe what properties of individuals
were measured in detail in the 'statistical presentation'
section of the Methods). Increasing the quantity of energy
that can be collected in a single period means that forag-
ing is less likely to occur, as it doesn't need to be con-
ducted so often (thereby reducing the player's overall
chances of being predated). Increasing either of the meta-
bolic costs means that the player requires more energy,
and consequently the likelihood that the player forages
increases. Increasing either of the predation risks associ-
ated with foraging reduces the likelihood that the player
forages, whilst increasing the risk experienced whilst rest-
ing means that foraging becomes more likely.
As would be expected, the likelihood of seeing both play-
ers resting shows an opposite trend to the likelihood of
both foraging, although trends are less pronounced when
considering changes in either the cost of foraging (when
the effects of changing the parameter are unpredictable)
or the predation risk experienced when foraging together
(when changing this risk appears to have no effect at all
upon resting behaviour).
There is little effect upon the likelihood that both players
conduct different behaviours during the period (with a
slight decrease in response to an increase in energetic
gain), and this is echoed in the relative lack of effect upon
the synchronisation coefficient, D', due to synchronisa-
tion offering such a large benefit to both players.
The changes in individuals' energy reserves mostly follow
predictable patterns: increasing energetic gain and its
associated increase in resting behaviour leads to there
being less need to keep energy reserves high in order to
avoid starvation, whilst increasing the cost of resting has
the opposite effect. Increasing the cost of foraging has no
obvious effect, presumably because of a complex trade-off
between the costs and gains directly incurred by the activ-
ity. Changes in predation risks do not give obvious trends,
apart from an increase in average reserve level in response
to an increase in the risk from resting, presumably in tan-
dem with the increase seen in foraging.
There are some effects upon the repetition of behaviours
over subsequent periods. Strings of repetitions become
longer when energetic gain increases – presumably
because players are able to rest for longer periods of time.
Similarly, increasing the costs of resting means that play-
ers have to swap between resting and foraging more often,
although increasing the cost of foraging doesn't have a
similar effect. Predation appears to have no obvious effect
on the length of time a behaviour is repeated, although
making resting more risky reduced the benefits of avoid-
ing foraging for consecutive periods.
The difference in energy reserves between the pair shows
the opposite trend to the length of time a player was seen
to repeat behaviours. Large differences in reserves mean
that the two players are likely to maintain their rôles
within the pair for longer, as there is less chance that the
player with the larger reserves will lose them through a
run of bad foraging periods to the point where rôles are
swapped. This suggests that rôles are maintained for
longer when players are less likely to repeat the same
activity for long periods of time.
The benefits of paying attention to the co-player, as
defined by C and S, falls as energy becomes easier to
acquire, but rises when resting becomes expensive (but
isn't affected by foraging becoming expensive), presuma-
bly because making a mistake and behaving incorrectly
becomes more important when metabolic requirements
dictate that the player should forage more often. Making
a mistake would mean that a player would be more likely
to end up foraging on its own, and so increasing the risks
associated with that mistake means that C and S increase,
whilst increasing the risks associated with doing the same
activity as the co-player leads to a fall in the benefits expe-
rienced.
Policy effects of asymmetric model
Table 2 details all the asymmetric model trends observed.
Generalising the results, we found that trends in the prop-
erties of player two in response to asymmetries in param-
eters between the two players tended to (but didn't
always) follow those seen in response to similar parame-
ter changes in the symmetric model. However, trends in
the properties of player one (whose personal parameters
weren't being systematically altered) could not easily be
predicted from the symmetric case. We describe these
trends in more detail below.
Changes in the energetic requirements of player two leads
to changes in ndividual foraging behaviour identical to
those described for the symmetric model. As well as occur-
ring in player two, these changes also occur in player one,
presumably because the advantages of synchronising
behaviour with player two. This is reflected in the corre-
sponding increases or decreases in the likelihood of both
players resting or foraging at the same time. When the
players behave differently during a period, the likelihood
that player two is the foraging individual follows the same
trend as the likelihood that player two forages regardless
BMC Evolutionary Biology 2008, 8:51 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/8/51
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of the actions of player one. Changes in the predation
risks of player two yield generally similar trends in the
behaviours of both players, although these are less dis-
cernable in some cases. Similarly, the mean energy
reserves of player two reflect those seen in response to the
changes made in the symmetric model. Interestingly,
although the corresponding changes in player one's
energy reserves are mostly straightforward increases or
decreases, the trends seen are not immediately predictable
from those made by player two.
The synchronisation coefficient D' reflects the relation-
ship between proportions of a stable population conduct-
ing the four possible pairs of behaviour. The values of D'
seen don't echo those seen in the symmetric model, and
don't reveal much about how parameter changes affect
pair behaviour. The only simple trend from a metabolic
effect comes where the cost of foraging increases,
although it is unclear why this should show a trend whilst
the other metabolic effects don't. When the foraging pre-
dation risks experienced by player two increase, D' either
increases (with an increase in predation risk when forag-
ing alone) or decreases (with an increase in the predation
risk of foraging together).
The difference in energy reserves between the members of
a pair isn't affected by changes in energetic gain, but is
affected by metabolic costs: making foraging more costly
increases the difference, whilst making resting more costly
decreases it. Increasing predation risk whilst foraging
alone or resting also leads to an increase in the reserve dif-
ference between players. Apart from the latter, none of the
trends seen match those seen in the symmetric case, sug-
gesting that there are complex trade-offs involved in deter-
mining reserve differences. This is echoed in the lack of
similarity seen in the lengths of time that players repeat
behaviours for.
The benefits of paying attention to the co-player defined
by C and S follow similar trends to the symmetric model
for both players, with the exception of when the cost of
foraging increases (where there was an increase the bene-
fits of conducting the correct behaviour when the cost was
asymmetric), and when foraging together becomes more
dangerous (leading to a similar trend).
Discussion
These models generate a number of interesting predic-
tions about the behaviour of pairs of animals. Firstly, we
Table 2: Changes in behaviours, reserves, and other individual properties when parameters are increased in asymmetric models. The 
parameters specific to player two were systematically altered as detailed in the methods section. Results given come from visual 
inspection of result sets: '↑↑' denotes a strong tendency for the property to increase with an increase in the parameter investigated; '↑' 
denotes a noisier but visible increase; '↓↓' denotes a strong tendency for the property to decrease; '↓' denotes a noisier but visible 
decrease; '-' denotes that the value of the property investigated did not change in response to changes in the value of the parameter; 
and '×' denotes that changes in the value of the parameter led to unpredictable changes in the property measured. Note that in the 
columns referring to changes in player two's metabolic cost of resting and predation risk whilst resting, the parameter value 
systematically being increased is lower than that of player one: this leads to the difference between the parameter values of the two 
players becoming smaller as the value of player two's parameter increases. In the other four columns, player two's parameter is 
greater than that of player one, and so an increase in its value leads to an increase in the difference between the values for the two 
players.
Property Changes in property in response to
Increase in Increase in Increase in predation risk when
Energetic gain Foraging cost Resting cost Foraging alone Foraging together Resting
Likelihood player one forages ↓↓ ↑↑ ↑↑ ↓ × -
Player two forages ↓↓ ↑↑ ↑↑ ↓↓ ↓ ↑↑
Likelihood both players forage ↓↓ ↑↑ ↑↑ ↓ ↓↓ ↑↑
One forages, two rests ↑ ↓ ↓↓ - ↑↑ ↓↓
One rests, two forages ↓↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ × ↑↑
Both players rest ↑↑ ↓↓ ↓↓ ↑↑ × ↓↓
Synchrony coefficient, D' × ↑ - ↑ ↓ ×
Mean energy reserves player one ↓↓ ↑↑ ↑ ↓↓ × ×
Player two ↑↑ ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓ ↑
Immediate energy reserves difference 
within pair
× ↑↑ ↓ ↑ - ↑
Length of time player one repeats 
behaviour
- - ↓ ↑ - -
Length of time player two repeats 
behaviour
× ↑ ↓↓ ↑ - ↓
C – Player one ↓↓ ↑↑ ↑↑ ↑ ↑ ↓↓
Player two ↓↓ ↑ ↑↑ ↑ ↑↑ ↓↓
S – Player one ↓↓ ↑↑ ↑↑ ↑ × ↓↓
Player two ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ × ↓
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confirm the results of Rands et al. [68] that behaviour can
(and very often should) be highly synchronised, with syn-
chronisation becoming increasingly more apparent when
asymmetries between individuals are considered. Further-
more, even if there is no difference between individuals,
there is enough complexity in the models to allow a sepa-
ration of the players into two different rôles (characterised
by low or high energy reserves). This affects their subse-
quent behaviour, their reaction to their co-player, and the
ongoing rôle separation between the pair. One important
result (or rather, lack of result) from this model is the rel-
ative lack of predictable patterns seen in response to asym-
metries between the players: given that the modelling
assumptions used here about asymmetries were simple
and uncomplicated (e.g. one individual uses more energy
than its co-player, and nothing else is different), if we were
to systematically increase or decrease the asymmetry, we
would normally expect a well-behaved model to generate
some corresponding increase, decrease, or other recognis-
able patterns. What we instead saw was, in many cases,
something that wasn't easily describable, suggesting that
the model assumptions were generating something com-
plex and potentially chaotic (a feasible option given that
many simple ecological systems have been shown to lead
to chaotic dynamics [78-81]).
Behavioural synchronisation
The models showed that the emergence of synchronisa-
tion is very robust, with synchrony coefficient values near
unity in most cases. Therefore, this lends support to the
hypothesis [43] that behavioural synchronisation occurs
principally because it increases some property of the
members of the group (such as a reduction in predation
risk, or an increase in energetic gain). But is this realistic?
Many experimental studies have shown that synchronisa-
tion of foraging behaviour does occur, but it should be
noted that in most of these studies, the characterisation of
'synchronisation' is based upon either anecdotal evidence,
or simple statistical tests for similarities of behaviour [and
there has been debate about the validity of these tests: [82-
85]]. Specific techniques for quantifying behavioural syn-
chronisation have been devised by Engel & Lamprecht
[86], and used to show synchronisation of behaviour in
ungulates [34,41-43]. These studies and a number of
other works [87-91] suggest that because the different
sexes of large sexually-dimorphic herbivores differ in their
digestive and metabolic ability, it is difficult for the two
sexes to forage together in synchrony, as their energetic
gain would be compromised, and so this may be a con-
tributory factor to why members of these species are usu-
ally found in single-sex foraging groups. This could be
explored using the rule-of-thumb described in this model,
using spatially-explicit simulations of the movements of
groups [similar to those described by [92,93]] where indi-
viduals differ in their energetic requirements [see also
[94,95] for an individual-based model of segregation].
Similar arguments about metabolic requirements may
lead to other types of non-heterogeneous assortment of
animals, such as those seen in many species of fish, where
shoals consist of individuals sharing similar parasite
loads, or morphology [96].
In addition to the techniques described above for testing
synchronisation, in [68] we introduced the synchronisa-
tion coefficient statistic D' as a simple means of assessing
the proportion of a population that is synchronised at a
moment in time. We would caution against its usefulness
in experimental studies – particularly because it was near
unity in most of the models examined, and because we
found few testable trends that would occur in response to
environmental manipulation.
There is therefore evidence to suggest that foraging can be
synchronised in natural situations, and hence the general
predictions of the model may hold. The model also sug-
gests that there should be near-total asynchrony of behav-
iours if foraging together is less advantageous than
foraging alone. However, as discussed by Rands et al. [68],
it is debatable whether this is a useful result. If social for-
aging is disadvantageous, then individuals should be
selected to forage solitarily. Furthermore, the situation
modelled here depends upon members of a pair knowing
each other's energetic reserves. If their activities mean that
they are separated spatially (as a foraging individual is
unlikely to be near a resting individual), then it is unlikely
that a strategy dependent upon precise knowledge of a co-
player's energetic reserves will evolve as there will be no
opportunity to gauge a co-player's energetic reserves dur-
ing foraging (although it is more feasible if the species is
social during some other behaviour, such as sharing a
roost or breeding site).
Rôles of individuals
As well as the synchronisation of feeding behaviour,
another interesting property that emerges from the model
is both the distinct separation of the energetic reserves of
individuals, and the rôles of the two players that emerge
with this property. In the simpler of the two policies dis-
cussed (Fig. 1bi), we expect to see one individual with low
reserves, and one with high reserves, whilst in cases with
more complex policies (such as Fig. 1ci), there is still a
separation of state into one light individual and one heavy
individual, but this is partially dependent upon which set
of energy-reserve levels the pair can fluctuate around. The
individual whose energy reserves are at a decision bound-
ary (where a fall in reserves will necessitate foraging,
whilst a rise will mean resting) will act as the 'pace-maker'
for the pair, acting as the individual that decides when the
pair should forage. The pace-maker should generally be
the lighter of the two individuals if synchronous behav-
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iours occur (for if the individual with the larger reserves is
the pace-maker, its co-player is more likely to fall to its
lower boundary threshold, where it must forage regardless
of its co-player, removing any control over behaviour by
the individual with the larger reserves).
The statistics C and S were proposed as a means of deter-
mining the amount of independence a player has with
regard to the reserves and behaviour of its co-player [97],
where S is the more biologically relevant statistic of the
two, as it is based upon the benefits to a player of possess-
ing information about its co-player. Because C and S
present similar measures, it is reassuring that the general
trends in these that we recorded in our sensitivity analyses
are the same. Higher values of either statistic mean that
the actions of a player are highly dependent upon those of
its co-player. Therefore, we would suggest that leadership
behaviour would be more likely to occur when C or S is
high, especially if coupled with a high likelihood of play-
ers repeating behaviours over consecutive periods. This
would occur in the symmetric case when the resting pre-
dation risk was very low.
We predict that we would be more likely to see leadership
in non-identical players when there was a large difference
in the foraging costs experienced by the two players.
Therefore, although leadership can emerge as a property
of identical individuals, a noticeable metabolic difference
between individuals causes this to be even more likely
(although the direction of the changes in C and S are the
same for both players, meaning that we can't easily predict
whether the lighter or heavier individual is more likely to
become the leader). We also predict that leadership is
more likely if the predation risks experienced by either
player when foraging alone are similar, although this
would be more difficult to experimentally manipulate.
Many vertebrate species have been identified where some
form of leadership is identified as occurring (see Leblond
& Reebs [98] for a list), and it may well be the case that the
leader is a dominant (or experienced) individual rather
than a hungry one. Evidence for a 'hungry' individual act-
ing as the pace-maker is seen in swans [48], titmice
[99,100], and salmon [101]. Studies of the positioning
behaviour of captive and wild roach [102-104] have
shown no effect of body size on leadership of the group
(where leaders tend to get more food, but suffer an
increased predation risk). However, although the initia-
tion of shoal movements was not dependent upon state,
once moving, the lead was more likely to be taken by indi-
viduals that had been deprived of food. In plains zebra,
lactating females (with high energy requirements) were
more likely to be the initiators of movement within har-
ems, and no individual consistently acted as the leader
[67]. Experiments on captive zebra finches [105,106]
showed no relationship seen between either dominance
or body mass and leadership status. So, although gener-
ally supportive, evidence is ambiguous for whether ener-
getic reserves are important for decision-making in social
foragers.
The effects of pre-existing differences between individuals
The models described here also considered the effects of
simple asymmetries between the players. Our principle
findings showed that in changing metabolic requirements
or predation risk, the effects upon the individual having
these parameters changed were broadly similar to those
seen in the case with identical players, but the effects upon
its co-player were complex, and didn't follow easily quan-
tifiable patterns.
Although the effects of individual asymmetries are not
particularly clear, it can be seen that differing abilities of
players will have repercussions on their likelihood of con-
ducting certain behaviours, or being in specific states.
Understanding how individuals differ within natural pop-
ulations may allow us to predict their behaviour using
these models [92,107]. For example, within dominance
hierarchies, individuals may differ in their predation risks,
with subordinate individuals having greater risks than
dominant ones – perhaps leading to increased vigilance
time, or worse access to resources, such as observed by
Ekman [108]. Dominant and subordinate individuals can
have very different metabolic rates [109] and prey prefer-
ences [108,110]. Factors other than dominance also need
to be considered: individuals are bound to differ physio-
logically, and predation risk may differ between the sexes
in groups of foraging animals [111]. Also, to maintain a
manageable level of simplicity in our model we did not
consider the case where there could be an advantage to
resting together, which may occur in animals that forage
solitarily (such as bats). Similar arguments to those used
here to explain why animals forage together have been
given for why they should rest together, including preda-
tion reduction, and energetic cost reduction through ther-
moregulation [112,113], and we are confident that future
modelling work would show that this also leads to activity
synchronisation.
Conclusion
The model presented here considers a very simple case
with just two foragers, but activity synchronisation does
seem to appear in the repertoire of socially foraging ani-
mals. Through its simplicity, the model allows us to make
some basic predictions about state-dependent foraging
behaviour, but probably fails to pick up the effects of
larger group size [12,75]. Principally, the individuals are
constrained to interacting with the other member of their
foraging pair, which may not accurately represent what
happens in a larger foraging group where individuals can
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pick and choose who they forage with. In a related paper
[92], we extend the rules-of-thumb generated by this
model to consider what happens when animals following
these rules can interact with more than one individual,
and show that although fragmentation of large groups
into smaller ones is likely to occur, synchronisation is
important within the smaller groups. Empirically, group
size may be important in governing behaviour, e.g. sheep
in small groups graze for a shorter length of time than
those in large groups [114]. Group size may have effects
on the number of animals synchronising their behaviour,
and bigger groups may see a reduction [62] or increase
[55] in their synchrony. Group size will have effects upon
the relative predation risk of individuals, and this is
known to change patterns of foraging behaviour [115-
117].
Further development of state-dependent models may help
in answering questions of how groups should behave and
how group size should develop [92]. The two-player
model we present here is a first step, and the techniques
described could be extended to consider larger groups, but
at present we are principally limited by the increase in
computation time that would be necessary to do this
(each new individual considered would cause at the least
an exponential increase in the number of state variables to
consider, and the rules governing how energetic changes
and predation risk change with different numbers of indi-
viduals interacting will become much more complex). We
would also need to consider how these models related to
the cognitive processes of the animal modelled: it is, for
example, likely that a foraging animal will be paying
attention to more than one neighbour, but the number of
individuals it pays attention to will be limited both by its
ability to track multiple individuals, and the amount of
cognitive processing necessary to both track neighbours
and conduct suitable personal behaviour at the same
time. It should also be noted that dynamic models need
to be tested with care [118], although experimental evi-
dence suggests that this form of modelling can produce
ecologically meaningful predictions that are testable
[119,120]. Also, in some systems there may be a trade-off
between predation risk and starvation, as is modelled
extensively in papers by Houston & McNamara [121]. The
model presented in this paper could be used to identify
the canonical costs of actions in cases such as where pre-
dation risk is lower when foraging together, but interfer-
ence in gain exists.
Although it yielded a number of predictions, the asym-
metrical version of the model should be treated with cau-
tion when attempting to apply these results to natural
populations. As noted, it is necessary to have a good
understanding of the exact nature of an asymmetry before
it is possible to make predictions, and if animals differ in
more than one of the parameters investigated (which is
very likely), then opposing behavioural changes are likely
to confound what predictions can be made. Furthermore,
we must be careful to distinguish which player is the
'heaviest'. Apart from differences in energetic require-
ments, metabolism, and predation risk, we also need to
consider what we mean by 'heavier' individual: in a sexu-
ally dimorphic species where females are smaller than
males, a well-fed female will nonetheless be lighter than a
starving male, and may even have proportionally larger
energy reserves per unit of body weight. Therefore, it is
likely that if predictions are to be made sensibly for a par-
ticular species, then the biology of the species must be
inherent to conditions of the model used.
As discussed earlier, we have also suggested a rule-of-
thumb that generates social foraging behaviours that
approximate to an optimal policy for an individual to fol-
low. Using both this rule of thumb and abstractions of the
trends suggested by the asymmetrical results presented
here will allow us to construct models of group foraging
where individuals are following simple rules [as demon-
strated by [92]]. Individual-based models have been
highly successful in revealing and exploring much more
complex emergent behaviours at the level of the group
[122,123], and using theoretically-derived rules (as
opposed to rules which produce an approximation of a
behaviour, but which have no biological basis or reason-
ing underlying their use) within these models should
greatly add to our understanding of complex natural sys-
tems.
Methods
Outline
The model considers the actions of a pair of foraging ani-
mals. At consecutive discrete moments in time, each of the
animals decides either to spend the time until the next
decision period foraging, or to rest for the entire period.
Both animals decide at the same moment, and their deci-
sion is based upon their knowledge of both their own
energy reserves and those of their co-player – the ability of
an individual to assess the nutritional state of co-players
has been demonstrated in fish [124,125] and rats [126]. If
an animal forages, it has some probability of finding food
in the environment, where the amount of food present
follows a known probabilistic distribution. Both foraging
and resting are metabolically expensive, and incur differ-
ing average energy expenditures (again, the exact loss in a
period is probabilistically distributed). So, if the animal
rests, it will lose energy, whereas if the animal forages, it
will also use energy (where the average metabolic cost of
foraging is greater than that of resting) but also has the
chance of replenishing its stores, so on average its reserves
will increase.
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All the actions that an animal conducts will expose it to
predators, and it is assumed that foraging is more (or
equally) dangerous than resting. It is assumed however
that there is a reduction in risk when foraging with the co-
player. In most of the models considered, foraging
together entails a predation risk that is intermediate
between the risks incurred by resting or foraging alone.
Other advantages to foraging together were also explored,
e.g. where gain rate increased with multiple foragers, but
these are not described in detail here as they yield similar
results to the reduction in predation when foraging
together that is considered in this paper.
From these assumptions about the predation risks and
energetic changes incurred by both players conducting a
specific activity at a moment in time, we can therefore pre-
dict how the states of both players change with synchro-
nous or asynchronous behaviours. Using dynamic
programming techniques [121,127-129], we are able to
calculate how the behaviours of a pair relate to changes in
their fitnesses. Houston & McNamara [121] describe in
detail the conceptual framework behind the dynamic
game methodology used here.
Model details
The model focuses on the behaviour of a pair of individu-
als of two different types (where types can differ in their
predation risks, foraging success, or energetic expendi-
ture), over a long series of discrete time steps (in other
words, we assume an infinite time horizon). At the start of
each time step, both individuals make independent deci-
sions whether to rest or forage (until the next time step).
The action of individual i is denoted ui ∈ {R, F}, where R
represents the decision to rest and F to forage. Each indi-
vidual experiences some risk of predation during the cur-
rent time step, depending on its own decision and that of
its co-player. Specifically, the probability of death due to
predation is maR for an individual of type a when it rests,
maA when it forages alone (while its co-player rests), and
maT when it forages together with the other player. We
assume that for individual of type a, 0 <maR <maA ≤ maT.
Because players of two different types (labelled a and b)
can differ in their predation risks when conducting spe-
cific actions, we do not assume any relationship between
mau and mbu, u ∈ {R, A, T}. Note that the variables defined
(and parameters used in the figures) are summarised in
Table 3.
Each individual i may vary in its state, represented by its
energetic reserves xi, which takes integer values between 0
and Xi (the individual is assumed to be dead if xi = 0, while
reserves cannot rise above Xi). Energetic reserves are lim-
ited within these bounds. During any given time step,
each individual incurs uncertain energetic costs depend-
ent on its choice of behaviour. Specifically, the reserves of
an individual of type a that adopts action u in any given
time step is reduced by c units with probability κa(c; u),
where c ranges from 0 to cmax. When an individual of type
a forages during any given time step, its reserves are fur-
ther increased by g units with probability γa(g), where g
ranges from 0 to gmax. Cost and gain probabilities are
based upon discretised normal distributions, so that
where ,
μau and σau are the pre-discretised mean and standard
deviation of the energetic cost for an individual of type a
of conducting activity u, and νa and ψa are the pre-discre-
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Table 3: Parameters used in model. Default values used to generate the figures, and assumptions made in sensitivity analyses.
Variable Description Default values for figures 1 and 3 Default values for sensitivity analyses
cmax Largest cost possible 4.0 state units 3.0 state units
gmax Maximum gain during a period 8.0 state units 6.0 state units
k Error in decision making 0.0000001 0.0000001
λ Population adjustment constant 0.1 0.1
mA Predation risk when foraging alone 0.00050 --
mR Predation risk when resting 0.00010 --
mT Predation risk when foraging together 0.00025 --μF Mean cost of foraging 2.5 state units --μR Mean cost of resting 1.0 state units --ν Mean gain from foraging 5.0 state units --
ψ s.d. of energetic gain when foraging 2.0 state units --
S Maximum state possible 40 state units 40 state units
σF s.d. of energetic cost of foraging 0.5 state units 0.5 state unitsσR s.d. of energetic cost of resting 0.5 state units 0.5 state units
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tised mean and standard deviation of the energetic gain
experienced by an individual of type a when it forages.
A strategy π in this game specifies the probability that
individual i with energy reserves xi forages in any given
time step, given that the reserves of its co-player j are xj and
that the co-player is also following strategy π. This proba-
bility will be denoted π(i, xi, xj). Note that π encompasses
the paired responses of both an individual of type a to an
individual of type b and of an individual of type b to an
individual of type a. Note also that foraging decisions are
thus time-independent, and based only on the current
state of both players, rather than their history of past inter-
action. We seek an evolutionarily stable strategy π*, that
maximises the long-term survival of individual i, assum-
ing that its co-player j also adopts the ESS, and taking into
account errors in decision-making as detailed below.
Solution procedure
π* is calculated using an iterated, damped best-response
procedure. For the strategy of player i, we begin with can-
didate strategy π0 (the particular choice of initial candi-
date strategy does not affect the final ESS obtained; we
assume, however, that π0(i, xi, xj) = 0.5 for all xi, xj). Then,
an error-prone best response (π0) to this candidate strat-
egy is calculated as described below, and from this a new
candidate strategy π1 is derived as follows:
Here, λ determines the degree of damping [121,130].
Note that as the two players are not necessarily identical,
policy calculation must take into consideration both types
of player at each iterative step. The iterative procedure is
repeated, generating π2, π3, π4, and so on, until (πn) ≈ πn,
i.e. the best response by either player to the current candi-
date strategy are approximately equal to the candidate
strategy itself, which is deemed to occur when
. The
resulting strategy is taken to be the evolutionarily stable
strategy π*.
Calculation of best-response strategies
The error-prone best response (π) to a candidate strategy
π is obtained using dynamic programming. To derive this
time-independent best response strategy we proceed as
follows. First, we introduce a finite time horizon, i.e. we
suppose that the game is played over T time steps, where
T is large (the precise number of time steps is irrelevant).
Now let Wi(xi, xj, t; π) denote the maximum attainable
probability that an individual of type i who is alive at the
start of time step t, with energy reserves xi, paired with a
co-player of type j with reserves xj who follows the candi-
date strategy π, will survive until the start of the final time
step T. By default, we assume that Wi(xi, xj, T; π) = 1 for xi
> 0, and 0 for xi= 0. Survival probabilities Wi(xi, xj, t; π),
and optimal (error-prone) probabilities of foraging bi(xi,
xj, t; π) at earlier time steps t <T can then be calculated by
backwards iteration as described below, by considering at
each step the consequences of the different decisions open
to the focal individual. In this way, we obtain a time-
dependent best response strategy. We continue with the
process of backwards iteration until the state-dependent
probabilities of foraging specified by the time-dependent
strategy converge on fixed, time-independent values, i.e.
until bi(xi, xj, t - 1; π) ≈ bi(xi, xj, t; π) for all xi, xj, which is
deemed to occur when
.
The resulting set of foraging probabilities are taken to
specify the time-independent best response strategy (π),
since they represent optimal (error-prone) behaviour
given an infinite time horizon.
The process of backwards iteration, in which we derive
Wi(xi, xj, t; π) and bi(xi, xj, t; π) from Wi(xi, xj, t + 1; π), start-
ing with t = T - 1 and working backwards to lower values
of t, is carried out as follows. Let Hi(xi, xj, t; ui, uj) denote
the probability that an individual of type i who is alive at
the start of time step t, in state xi (> 0), paired with a living
co-player of corresponding type j in state xj (> 0) who fol-
lows the candidate strategy π, will survive until the start of
the final time step T, if it adopts action uiand its co-player
adopts action uj in the current time step (assuming that
the focal individual i thereafter behaves so as to maximise
its chances of surviving until time step T, taking into
account errors in decision making). We then have
bˆ
π λ π λπn n nb= −( ) ( ) +− −1 1 1ˆ .
bˆ
max , , , , ., ,i x x n i j n i ji j b i x x i x xπ π( )( ) − ( ) < 0 0001
bˆ
max , , ; , , ; ., ,i x x i i j i i ji j b x x t b x x t−( ) − ( ) <1 0 0001π π
bˆ
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where  and
.
Averaging over the possible actions of the co-player, the
probability (xi, xj, t;ui, π) that an individual of type i
who is alive at the start of time step t and has reserves xi (>
0), paired with a living co-player of type j who has reserves
xj (> 0), will survive until the start of the final time step T
if it adopts action ui during t, is given by
A strict best-response strategy would assign a probability
of 1 to the action that yields the greatest probability of sur-
vival. We follow McNamara et al. [131], however, in incor-
porating errors in decision making, such that there is
some probability of adopting the less profitable action.
The error-prone, best-response probability of foraging is
taken to be
Thus, the error-prone best-response strategy assigns equal
probabilities to foraging and resting when both yield the
same probability of survival, and otherwise assigns a
greater probability to the more profitable option (but
some non-zero probability to the less profitable course of
action). The parameter k determines the degree of error: a
higher value of k implies that choice is less strongly
skewed towards the more profitable action, while smaller
values of k yield strategies that more closely approximate
the strict best response.
Finally, having determined bi(xi, xj, t; π), we can then cal-
culate Wi(xi, xj, t; π) as
The calculations required when considering an individual
whose co-player is dead are similar in nature to those
described above, but simpler, since we do not need to
consider alternative possible decisions by the co-player
and their consequences. Using the above notation, we
have
The error-prone, best-response probability of foraging is
taken to be
and Wi(xi, 0, t; π) is given by
Lastly, considering a dead individual of type i, Wi(0, xj, t;π) = 0 for all t, xj.
Using the above series of calculations, we can derive opti-
mal (error-prone) decisions and probabilities of survival
at sequentially earlier time steps. As previously stated, we
continue to do so until the probabilities of foraging for
different state combinations converge on fixed, time-inde-
pendent values, which are taken to define the (time-inde-
pendent) best-response strategy.
Statistical presentation of results
For each set of parameters, a stable behavioural policy was
calculated for both individuals, giving the probability for
each possible combination of state values that each indi-
vidual should forage or rest during a period given that it
knows both its own state, and that of its co-player. The
pair of policies were then used to calculate the distribu-
tion of states of player pairs within a stable population.
We determined the exact distributions by forward itera-
tion using a Markov chain process [see [127] for details],
until the distribution of pairs of states within the popula-
tion was stable (to allow the population to reach a stabil-
ity with a non-zero value, we only considered the cases
where both individuals survived from one period to the
next). We recorded a number of statistical measures in
response to parameter changes:
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1. Behavioural properties
For foraging behaviour, we consider both the probability
of an individual foraging regardless of the behaviour of its
co-player (based on the proportions of individuals con-
ducting the behaviour in the stable population), and also
consider the more specific cases where either both players
are foraging, or where the focal individual is foraging, and
its co-player is resting. We also calculated the probability
of seeing both individuals resting, and, in the asymmetric
case, the probability that the focal player was resting
whilst its co-player foraged. We also calculated the average
number of times a player repeated a behaviour for. This
was done using the Markov chain forward iteration tech-
nique, initially noting the expected behaviours of a stable
population at a moment in time, and tracking the
expected behaviours of the population in subsequent
turns: using this, we were able to ascertain how many sub-
sequent periods were necessary before a given proportion
of the population had switched at least once in the behav-
iour they were conducting. We recorded the periods at
which at least 50%, 75%, 90% and 95% of the population
had switched behaviour at least once away from their ini-
tial focal behaviour.
2. Synchronisation
We calculated the likelihood of an individual or pair of
players in a stable population conducting a specific
behaviour or pair of behaviours in any given time step.
The latter was used to calculate a 'synchrony coefficient' D'
[based on the concept of linkage disequilibrium from
population genetics – see [132,133]], calculated as D' =
(pRRpFF - pRFpFR)/(pRRpFF + pRFpFR), where R = 'rest' and F =
'forage', and puv is the proportion of the population
tracked where the focal player conducts behaviour u ∈ {R,
F} and its co-player conducts behaviour v ∈ {R, F}. Using
this statistic, D' = +1 indicates complete synchronisation
of behaviours (where all the members of the population
tracked carry out the same behaviour as each other 100%
of the time), and D' = -1 indicates complete asynchrony
(where one player is always foraging and the other is
always resting).
3. Measures of sustainability of differences between individuals
We were also interested in how long differences between
the players are sustained: we calculated the mean differ-
ence between the energy reserves of the two players during
any given period of time, and the average number of peri-
ods that the player with the higher energy reserves at a
given moment in time remained the player with the
higher reserves. The general results described by Rands et
al. [68] demonstrated that individuals within the pair may
could display greatly different properties, even when the
parameters describing their energetic expenditures and
predation risks were identical (described in more detail
below): in order to quantify how much the actions of one
individual are determined by the behaviour and state of
its co-player, we use two statistics [described in detail in
[97]]: C, which is based upon the fitness cost to an indi-
vidual of conducting the wrong behaviour when its co-
player is in a specific state, and S, which is based upon
comparing an individual's uncertainty of performing the
correct behaviour when it either does or does not possess
information about its coplayer's state. Because C and S
should yield broadly similar results, we justify using both
here as a means of testing these statistical measures out
with a large data set (although in interpreting the statis-
tics, S is more deeply grounded in the biological reality of
this system, as it is based upon the value of information to
an individual, and so we would follow [97] in using this
statistic in preference to C).
All solutions to the games and their subsequent simula-
tion were calculated using a program coded in C++, using
the highest degree of precision possible [134].
Sensitivity analyses
For both the symmetric and asymmetric cases, sensitivity
analyses were conducted to individually explore the
effects of the principle parameters used in the model. For
the symmetric models where both players were identical,
we examined six cases where either ν, μF, μR, mR, mA or mT
was systematically altered. For the asymmetrical models
where players 1 and 2 could potentially differ in their
properties, the principal parameters were ν1, ν2, μ1F, μ2F,μ1R, μ2R, m1R, m2R, m1A, m2A, m1T and m2T; we systemati-
cally investigated the six possible single asymmetries
where players 1 and 2 differed in the value of one of these
parameters (so, for example, ν1 ≠ ν2, but μ1F = μ2F, μ1R =μ2R, m1R = m2R, m1A = m2A, and m1T = m2T).
For each of these twelve cases, 500 randomised parameter
sets were used. These were created by initially generating
six pseudorandom numbers ri (where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 6} and
ri is uniformly distributed within the range [0, 1]). Using
these, six temporary values of the initial parameters were
calculated:
(for the asymmetric cases, the equivalent parameters for
the two players were initially assumed to be identical: for
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example, ). Having defined these temporary
values, the five parameters that were not being investi-
gated were set equal to these temporary values (for exam-
ple, in investigating the effects of systematically changing
γ, we set  and
, whilst the parameter being systematically inves-
tigated took one of the following values in the symmetric
models:
In the asymmetric models, all the parameters for player
one were set equal to the temporary values, and all the
parameters for player two apart from the parameter that
was systematically altered were set equal to those of player
one. The parameters being systematically investigated
took one of the following values:
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